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THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INTELLECTUALS: CHOMSKY AND STUDENT 




 One finds in the Vietnam War a perfect exemplar of many of the themes that trace 
American history: a nation united by imperialism, colonialism, and anti-communism, and 
yet divided by dissent against those very same principles; a nation forced to choose 
between belief in its own ideological superiority as justification of its interventionist 
policies and its belief in freedom, self-determination, and isolationism; a nation fatally 
caught between arrogance and humility, competition and peace, crusades and questions. 
It is unsurprising, then, that such a large-scale war, one that consumed so much of the 
American population, would engender fierce support, fanaticism, and propaganda, as well 
as angry defiance, opposition, calls for peace and unilateral troop withdrawal. Noam 
Chomsky, as one of the first intellectuals to publicly criticize American involvement in 
the war, placed himself at the forefront of the opposition movement. Yet, in the end, his 
arguments served more to counter rationalizations of the opposite ideological extreme 
than to catalyze and create change among the war’s opposition movement. 
 The war began in 1955, when Ngô Đình Diệm of Vietnam announced that elections 
would not be held because South Vietnam had not accepted any agreement to do so.1 He 
                                                 
 1 For more background information on the war in Vietnam, see James E. 
Westheider, The Vietnam War (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing Co., 2007), Robert 
Mann, A Grand Delusion (NY: Basic Books Publishing, 2002), Grace Sevy, The 
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quickly took control of the South by painting communists as enemies and then rigged the 
referendum on the future of Vietnam, ending with 98.2 percent of the vote; estimates had 
previously predicted that the communist party would end up with about 80%. American 
politicians supported this rigged election in Vietnam, although they had recommended a 
more modest margin of victory.2 They feared a ‘domino’ effect of communism in Asia: if 
a nation fell to the horrors of a communist government, then presumably the surrounding 
nations would go through similar changes, leaving an entire region of communist threats. 
The Eisenhower administration wanted a strongly anti-communist nation in the area, and 
thus supported Diem because they considered him the best of the alternatives for the area. 
 United States involvement in the war in Vietnam began in 1963, when Diem was 
overthrown by a military coup that the United States at least tacitly supported.3 South 
Vietnam faced a period of extreme political instability. When Lyndon B. Johnson took 
over the American presidency at the time of John F. Kennedy’s death, Vietnam was not a 
priority, but, as the political situation deteriorated, he decided to expand the United 
States’s military commitment. Several attacks against the USS Maddox and Turner Joy 
                                                 
American Experience in Vietnam (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), and 
Mitchell K. Hall, The Vietnam War (NY: Pearson Longman, 2007). 
 
 2 James E. Westheider, The Vietnam War (Santa Barbara: Greenwood Publishing 
Co., 2007). 
 
 3 The considerations that brought the about-face in United States foreign policy 
would become a sticking point for analyses of the war. Edwin E. Moïse, in Tonkin Gulf 
and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1996) pointed to the unresponsiveness of Diem to “US suggestions that he reform his 
government.” Chomsky disagreed. See below in the text for his explanation. 
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were reported, although the circumstances around the events left room for questions.4 The 
United States Congress used these events to pass the Tonkin Gulf Resolution,5 which 
allowed intervention in Asia without a formal declaration of war, as long as the aim was 
to help a Southeast Asian ally. In turn, Johnson used this to legally justify massive 
military escalation in the affairs of Vietnam. United States troop involvement rose from 
2,000 in 1961 to 16,500 in 1965.  At the height of the war, after many escalating 
incidents, 536,100 troops from the United States occupied Vietnam, and ultimately more 
than one in ten were killed, while more than half were wounded. During that time, about 
three million Vietnamese, Cambodian, and Laotian civilians were killed; the total number 
of fatalities due to the war was almost ten million people; and public outrage over the 
many accounts of injustice, massacres like that of My Lai, government deception, and 
other atrocities of the war began to foment in the form of various resistance movements. 
Of particular interest is the opposition of the students to the war, beginning at campuses 
such as that of the University of California at Berkeley and spreading across the nation.  
 As early as 1965, university campuses had participated in opposition to the 
Vietnam War. The first “teach-in” took place on March 24, 1965, at the University of 
Michigan. The teach-in was a combination of disparate elements, part protest, part 
moratorium on classes, part festival, part folk singing, and, most importantly, part 
                                                 
 4 See Edwin E. Moïse, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996) for details of the attack, and 
Robert J. Hanyok, "Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish: The Gulf of 
Tonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964,"Cryptologic Quarterly, 19:4 (December 2000) for the 
citation of an internal National Security Agency memo stating that “there was no attack 
that night [of August 4 on the USS Turner Joy].” 
 
 5 See Asia Resolution, Public Law 88-408. Available at 
http://www.international.ucla.edu/eas/documents/tonkin.htm. 
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analysis of the Vietnam War. About three thousand students attended the first teach-in at 
Michigan; about two months later, on May 21 and 22, more than thirty thousand attended 
the Vietnam Day teach-in at the University of California at Berkeley. The latter protest 
was not simply successful in terms of numbers: during the gathering, the Vietnam Day 
Committee was born; the group, representing as it did the humble beginnings of the true 
student opposition movement, organized major actions including the May 5, 1965 
burning of draft cards and the International Days of Protest Against American Military 
Intervention on October 15 and 16. The latter was participated in by hundreds of 
thousands of anti-war protesters, including about ten thousand at Berkeley itself. Student 
protests such as the ones of the Vietnam Day Committee continued through 1965 and 
1966.6 And, in early 1967, more than five thousand scientists of the United States signed 
a petition asking the President to stop using certain types of weapons which were said to 
be inhumane.  
 One of the people historically acknowledged to have led the intellectual opposition 
movement was Noam Chomsky, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology. According to historians Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Chomsky 
                                                 
 6 The paradigm of the student movement attracted considerable attention in 
Washington. In 1970, the President’s Commission on Campus Unrest gave a name to the 
pattern that had developed with the Berkeley students five years earlier: “the Berkeley 
invention.” It denoted an escalating movement in which students on a small scale staged 
a disruption of the university over some larger issue, which would involve the campus 
police, setting up mass arrests and eventually a full-on student strike. The commission 
reported that, distinctive of the Berkeley invention, “high spirits and defiance of authority 
that had characterized the traditional school riot were now joined to youthful idealism 
and to social objectives of the highest importance.” For more information, see Nancy 
Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Who Spoke Up: American Protest Against the War in 
Vietnam 1963-1975 (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984). The student movements 
were in some sense the most revolutionary and important part of the opposition against 
American involvement in the Vietnam War.  
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had been active in the antiwar movement since 1964, a time when none 
but a very few were receptive to the notion that America’s policies 
represented error, much less that they constituted a moral wrong. His 
writings on the subject became a major resource and an important part of 
the intellectual and moral foundation of the antiwar movement. Chomsky 
[was] as scornful of doves [i.e., peace advocates] who opposed the war on 
pragmatic grounds as he was of the successive Washington 
administrations that led the nation into Vietnam and kept it there… 
Chomsky feared that an elaborate groundwork of misinterpretation was 
being laid to justify a subsequent reentry of U.S. bombing and air power in 
the Vietnam theater of war. His letter to the New York Times [sic], 
expressing similar opinions… evoked little response. America wanted to 
forget.7 
 
Of particular import are two claims: that Chomsky’s writings “became a major resource 
and an important part of the intellectual and moral foundation of the antiwar movement,” 
and that his writings were not widely accepted because “America wanted to forget.” 
What follows will examine those two views more closely.   
 Noam Chomsky graduated from Central High School in Philadelphia to attend the 
University of Pennsylvania, studying linguistics and philosophy. He earned his BA in 
linguistics in 1949, his MA in 1951, and his Ph.D four years later in 1955. That same 
year, he joined the faculty of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology as a professor of 
Linguistics, where he has maintained an academic post ever since. Chomsky is noted as 
an intellectual cult figure who has gained exceptional notoriety in academia for two 
diverging patterns of thoughts, the first concerning an idea in linguistics called generative 
grammar and the second concerning his political writings, which are situated in the 
tradition of searing critiques of United States foreign policy.  
 In order to consider what place Chomsky held in the opposition to the Vietnam 
War, especially in the student protests, one must consider in more depth the attacks that 
                                                 
 7 Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Who Spoke Up: American Protest Against 
the War in Vietnam 1963-1975 (NY: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984), 405.  
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he laid upon social institutions such as universities and the press, to then consider 
whether students made use of his work in justifying their revolts against American 
foreign policy. 
 On February 23,1967, near the crest of American involvement in Vietnam, Noam 
Chomsky authored a paper, published as a special selection from The New York Review 
of Books, titled “The Responsibility of Intellectuals.”8 The essay set out Chomsky’s 
views on the intelligentsia and social institutions of learning in America. He argued that 
educated academics hold a special place in society because they have a duty to tell the 
truth and expose lies, functioning as a sort of quality control, filter, or manipulator of 
historical events, news, and major ideas. According to Chomsky, America’s intelligentsia 
both was and still is subservient to the status quo of power in the United States. During 
the Vietnam War, the intelligentsia primarily accepted the propaganda and doctrines of 
government and other highly-regarded authorities. In fact, social scientists, members of 
educational institutions, and other academics who were supposed to be the leaders of 
moral fabric of the nation actually turned during the war toward providing a pseudo-
scientific justification for the United States’s involvements, including claims of the 
imperative nature of the “defense of freedom” and the deeply held belief that the 
Vietnamese, Laotians, Cambodians, etc., were inferior, inhuman. Chomsky castigated 
this function of the intelligentsia, pointing out that it was also one of the reasons for the 
ideological homogeneity of America’s political landscape. The people who spoke up, 
according to Chomsky, were unconcerned with ideas of academic credentials or historical 
standards but simply made common-sense observations about fairly clear-cut issues of 
                                                 
 8 Noam Chomsky, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals,” The New York Review of 
Books, 8:3 (February 1967). 
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right and wrong in policy. This role, he said, was played mostly by students and scientists 
in opposition to the Vietnam War, rather than social scientists, historians, political 
scientists, and philosophers. 
 Noam Chomsky criticized the “liberal press” for its commentary on Vietnam post-
war, noting that while it “supported the ‘doves,’ ” it did so “[b]y stressing the ‘stupidity’ 
of the U.S. intervention; that’s a politically neutral term. It would have been sufficient to 
find an ‘intelligent’ policy. The war was thus a tragic error in which good intentions were 
transmuted into bad policies, because of a generation of incompetent and arrogant 
officials. The war’s savagery is also denounced; but that too is used as a neutral category 
. . . Presumably the goals were legitimate—it would have been all right to do the same 
thing, but more humanely . . . .”9 Chomsky argued that the press offered a disturbingly 
homogeneous ideological approach to the war: that while commentators might have 
disagreed on whether the war was carried out badly or well, all disagreement took place 
in the sphere of methods, rather than principles; nobody was fundamentally evil for 
pursuing the war in principle, only ‘incompetent’ for not achieving certain goals. In 
response to a New York Times editorial claiming that historical analysis in the future will 
decide whether the war failed because it was stupid or because it was misguided, 
Chomsky remarked satirically, “The sphere of Clio [the goddess of history] does not 
extend to such absurd ideas as the belief that the United States has no unique right to 
intervene with force in the internal affairs of others, whether such intervention is 
successful or not.”10 
                                                 
 9 Noam Chomsky, Language and Responsibility (NY: The New Press, 1977), 35.  
 
 10 Ibid., 35. 
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 While there might be certain extremely complicated problems that require intense 
training to understand, the vast majority of the important questions are the moral ones, 
according to Chomsky. How do the elite justify the complexity of the problems that they 
face? Chomsky pointed to what he called  “pseudo-scientists.” Of author Herman Kahn, 
who designated an entire vocabulary and set of terminology to just war in an attempt to 
view it as a science, Chomsky said,  
Of course this is all nonsense… What is remarkable is that serious people 
actually pay attention to these absurdities, no doubt because of the facade 
of tough-mindedness and pseudo-science. I would simply like to 
emphasize that, as is no doubt obvious, the cult of the experts is both self-
serving, for those who propound it, and fraudulent. … In particular, if 
there is a body of theory, well-tested and verified, that applies to the 
conduct of foreign affairs or the resolution of domestic or international 
conflict, its existence has been kept a well-guarded secret. In the case of 
Vietnam, if those who feel themselves to be experts have access to 
principles or information that would justify what the American 
government is doing in that unfortunate country, they have been singularly 
ineffective in making this fact known. To anyone who has any familiarity 
with the social and behavioral sciences…, the claim that there are certain 
considerations and principles too deep for the outsider to comprehend is 
simply an absurdity, unworthy of comment.11  
 
Chomsky’s views on how and why fake scientific theories are used to justify certain 
actions and policy decisions became key in his eventual claim that public debate over the 
issue was fundamentally skewed, an issue that he would eventually take on through the 
medium of his writings.  
 Chomsky later developed a more substantial support for his view that the 
intelligentsia bear much of the responsibility for the Vietnam War in a book titled 
                                                 
 11 Chomsky, “The Responsibility of Intellectuals” 3.  
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American Power and the New Mandarins.12 It set out the argument that the aim of United 
States policy in Vietnam was actually to destroy nationalist movements like that of South 
Vietnam (which the United States had originally supported), rather than to defend the 
South Vietnamese people from the aggression of the North and to uphold the ideals of 
anti-communism. This, he said, was actually accomplished fairly well, but it had to be 
placed at the expense of the ostensible goal of the time, to protect the South.  Chomsky’s 
critique found its logical conclusion with the idea that American motives could not 
include the protection of South Vietnam’s own interests; rather, the only imaginable goal 
of the United States’ government must have been to crush the nationalist movements of 
South Vietnam, whatever their form. He criticized the view of Ithiel Pool for “rul[ing] out 
of consideration… a large range of viable political settlements,” most significantly any 
that would imply “the inclusion of the Viet Cong in a coalition government or even the 
persistence of the Viet Cong as a legal organization in South Vietnam…[however,] the 
Viet Cong is too strong to be simply beaten or suppressed.”13 Pool’s view was that even a 
nationalistic movement that might deserve its own right of autonomy could not be just if 
Americans did not like its principles. Chomsky argued that the Viet Cong could very well 
be a legal representative of the South Vietnamese people, not simply because it was “too 
strong to be simply beaten” as Pool suggested. Moreover, the fact that the United States 
was so stubborn in its refusal to recognize rights for the Viet Cong meant that the States 
must have had an ulterior motive for doing so, and this Chomsky took to be the 
destruction of South Vietnamese nationalism.   
                                                 
 12 Noam Chomsky, American Power and the New Mandarins (NY: The New 
Press, 1969).  
 13 Ibid., 49.  
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 The tenor of student opposition to United States involvement in the Vietnam War 
crescendoed from 1967 onward. Two main events demonstrate different paradigms of 
landmarks in opposition to the Vietnam War after the beginning of 1967. The first 
occurred on March 12, 1967, when a three-page advertisement appeared in the New York 
Times, consisting of signatures from 6,766 teachers and professors across the country. 
This constituted the first main marshaling of American intellectual force against the war. 
The second began on May 3, 1970 and brought the deaths of four unarmed students at 
Kent State University in Ohio, shot by police. In response, on May 8, students across the 
country shut down colleges and universities in what was called the National Student 
Strike of 1970, marching on the nearest military offices and leaving about thirty of the 
offices completely destroyed. But first, in order to understand the contrast between 
student opposition before 1967 and opposition after it, the primary example of early (pre-
1967) student opposition to the war will be considered.   
 The Vietnam Day Committee occupies an interesting place in the history of 
opposition to the Vietnam War. Chronologically prior to most of the largest and most 
recognized landmarks of the movement, the committee marked the beginning of a rolling 
stone of anger and fear that gathered far more moss than its organizers could have 
imagined, sparking draft card burnings, nationwide protests, and organized student 
oppositions. But what reasoning lay underneath the committee’s protests? The Vietnam 
Day Committee gave a straightforward account of the reasons for protesting against the 
Vietnam War. In preparation for the October 15 and 16, 1965 International Days of 
Protest Against American Military Intervention, the committee released a statement 
detailing its plans to its own organizational partners and to any interested layperson:  
  Krane 11 
The United States government is stepping up its actions against the 
Vietnamese people. Every day now U. S. planes drop 100 or more tons of 
bombs on the South Vietnamese peasant villages and countryside. North 
Vietnamese constructions are daily bombed, from hospitals to 
hydroelectric plants. In the U. S. attacks on the peace movement are 
becoming sharper and sharper as the war intensifies. We must not be 
silenced in the face of these attacks. A massive international protest on 
October 15 and 16 thus becomes all the more vital as a step in building a 
movement against American intervention in Vietnam.14  
 
Fascinatingly, this was the only justification of protest that the entire statement gave. 
More importantly, there was no argument about justified or unjustified war, weapons that 
were humane or inhumane, violations of sovereignty or just self-determination, or 
anything of the sort. The claim was simply that people were dying, innocent people, and 
that it had to stop. One is tempted to dismiss this statement as that of a naïve, peaceful 
group that had little understanding of the realities of war. That would be a mistake. The 
statement lacks, undeniably, the sophisticated justification of later arguments against the 
war. Yet it is fascinating exactly for that reason: righteousness pervades the statement so 
deeply that only the smallest of moments is spared to justify or explain the group’s own 
actions, signifying essentially that the group’s members were utterly convinced that they 
were in the right. In other words, without justification or argument, without complicated 
theories of pseudo-science and press manipulation, the deeply held intuition taking root 
in the student movement said that the Vietnam War had to be opposed on grounds of 
justice. Anything else would be inconceivable.  
 Teachers and scholars began to unite across the country in opposition to the war in 
Vietnam during the years of 1967-1969. On March 12, 1967, the New York Times 
published a three-page advertisement consisting of a statement and signatures from 6,766 
                                                 
 14 Statement through the University of California Libraries’ Calisphere, available 
at http://content.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/kt3h4n99mj/?&query=, accessed 16 February 2011. 
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teachers and professors across the country. The New York Times’s Douglas Robinson 
wrote,  
A large group of teachers and educators across the country appealed 
yesterday for an end to the Vietnam war and accused the Government [sic] 
of withholding information about the conflict from the American people… 
The statement contends that the Vietnam war continues ‘because vital 
facts about its origin and development have been deliberately glossed 
over, distorted and withheld from the American people.’ It asks the 
American people to join in urging that the Government [sic] take the 
following step…[a]dopt the ‘realistic’ position that the National Liberation 
Front is the representative of a ‘substantial portion’ of the South 
Vietnamese people… [there are] more than 7,500 [American youth] 
already dead protecting a corrupt military dictatorship against the wishes 
of the Vietnamese people… The statement continues, ‘…And as teachers, 
we feel a particular responsibility to the youth and children of our 
nation—and of all nations.’15 
 
This anomalous advertisement’s claim of “withh[eld] information” was unsurprising, 
considering the repeated exposure of falsehoods that would later culminate in the leaked 
Pentagon Papers and other journalistic expositions. More unexpected are two of the other 
claims made by the alliance of teachers. One is that the insurgent National Liberation 
Front, the Viet Cong, “is the representative of a ‘substantial portion’ of the South 
Vietnamese people.”16 As Chomsky pointed out, most Americans at the time were 
unwilling to recognize questions about the legitimacy of the war in principle. Many were 
reluctant to believe that United States foreign policy, rather than being simply a failure of 
correct practice given the ideology of justice, had actually been dictated by a completely 
                                                 
 15 Douglas Robinson, “An Appeal to End Vietnam War Is Signed by 6,766 
Educators,” New York Times, 31:6,297 (March 12, 1967). 
 
 16 The teachers’ point here does not come directly from Chomsky, as his 
expanded theory on Southern Vietnamese nationalism was not published until several 
years later. Rather, the widened debate sphere created by Chomsky’s article allowed for 
the point to be made.  
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different and contrary ideology to stated policies of protecting South Vietnam. Yet the 
teachers of the advertisement, riding on the back of Chomsky’s “The Responsibility of 
Intellectuals,” acknowledged that to do as the United States had been doing, backing the 
South Vietnamese government against the North Vietnam and the Vietcong, supported 
injustice, because the Vietcong were a legitimate representative of the general will of 
South Vietnam, representation being a principle of legitimation that Americans take to be 
of the highest importance.17  The other remarkable claim was that “as teachers, we feel a 
particular responsibility to the youth and children of our nation—and of all nations.” It is 
no coincidence that the statement ended with a claim about intellectual responsibility 
transcending nations and boundaries, patriotism and economic self-interest. Yet, as one 
may reasonably point out, this advertisement of 6, 766 teachers was published only 
seventeen days after Chomsky’s “The Responsibility of Intellectuals.” Speaking purely in 
terms of chronology, it seems impossible to suggest that Chomsky’s essay catalyzed this 
outpouring of intellectual opposition to the war in Vietnam. Moreover, as the analysis of 
the Vietnam Day Committee statement demonstrated, much of the fervor and 
righteousness in the intellectual opposition to the Vietnam War existed well before 
Chomsky’s essay was published. The more appropriate understanding is that Chomsky 
                                                 
 17 It is worth noting that the teachers did not clearly ascribe a particular motive 
(i.e., mistaken justice or self-interested attempts to destroy nationalism) to the 
government, though the language used to describe the actions of the government 
(“corrupt,” “dead,” “against the wishes”) certainly implies a value judgment. Thus, it may 
be said that the writers of this statement occupied a middle ground between (1) the public 
sphere debate over the war, framed in terms of pragmatism and success, not questioning 
the justice of the actions or intent of the government, and (2) the radical interpretation of 
the debate, exemplified by Chomsky, framed exactly in terms of right and wrong, not 
only of the actions but more importantly of the motives of governmental policymakers, to 
whom Chomsky in American Power and the New Mandarins explicitly ascribed the 
motive to destroy South Vietnamese nationalist movements, an unjust goal.  
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did not create this particular marshalling of force but rather helped shape its justification, 
its language, its logic and the frames of its debate. His essay did not cause more than six 
thousand teachers to sign a petition in two weeks. But it did affect the way that the people 
took the signatures and added a petition and a statement of ideas. A wider framework of 
debate, and a language of responsibility in academia and teaching: these were the true 
manifestations of the impact of “The Responsibility of Intellectuals.”18 
 Two years later, a very different kind of protest swept college campuses across the 
nation. It began with the April 30, 1970 announcement by President Richard Nixon that 
America was set to begin invading Cambodia. The given reasoning was that the North 
Vietnamese military received supplies through Cambodia, which it then transmitted to 
troops on the offensive in the South.19 At Kent State, students burned down the ROTC 
building in protest. But the real trouble came almost a week later. On May 3, as Kent 
State announced its participation in the nationwide protests over the decision to invade, 
police forced students into their rooms for the night. The next day, students began to 
gather in protest, both against their treatment the previous night and also against the 
                                                 
 18 While not strictly a protest or event, the Committee of Concerned Asian 
Scholars in 1969 released a statement with similar language, saying, “We first came 
together in opposition to the brutal aggression of the United States in Vietnam and to the 
complicity or silence of our profession with regard to that policy. Those in the field of 
Asian studies bear responsibility for the consequences of their research and the political 
posture of their profession.” The full founding resolution may be found at 
http://criticalasianstudies.org/about-us/bcas-founding-statement.html. Again, note the 
reference to responsibility versus complicity in aggression that dominates the tone of this 
statement. It seems that such language was not at all an isolated event, which further 
supports the idea of how the Chomskyian theory of responsibility infiltrated standards of 
proper social science work.  
 
 19 President Nixon’s incursion address, available at 
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/richardnixoncambodia.html. 
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President’s news. The National Guardsman who had been posted to the school carried 
tear gas and M-1 rifles in the loaded position as they prepared for confrontation. Tear gas 
canisters were fired on the students, and when some did not explode, students responded 
by throwing them back at the Guardsmen. Students taunted the Guardsmen, attempting to 
throw rocks and other objects at the guards, who were mostly out of arm-range. At some 
point, gunfire erupted, and sixty-one bullets were fired. Four Kent State University 
students were killed, and nine more were wounded.20 The United States university system 
ground to a halt.  More than half of the colleges in the country staged some sort of 
protest, and all in all more than four million students participated. Hundreds of colleges 
canceled class; more than fifty did not reopen that semester.  
 Because the reaction to the Kent State ‘massacre’ was so swift and severe, there is 
little writing of justification for the protests; sheer outrage, far stronger than words, 
dominated the political atmosphere. The most oft-cited memorial of the shootings is not 
any piece of writing or spoken account but rather a photograph, taken by John Filo, of 
fourteen-year-old Mary Ann Vecchio kneeling over the body of Jeffrey Miller after he 
was shot in the mouth. The photograph won a Pulitzer Prize and came to represent the 
civil war that accompanied United States involvement in Vietnam. A study by the Urban 
Institute pointed to the Kent State massacre as the single factor leading to the strike 
across the nation’s college campuses, the largest student protest in United States 
                                                 
 20 For an account of the event, see Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Who 
Spoke Up: American Protest Against the War in Vietnam 1963-1975 (NY: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, 1984). 
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history.21 The outrage that precipitated the nationwide college shutdown was not rational 
or in need of justification in the philosophical, moral, or argumentative sense. It was 
complete reactionary anger, something that no essay in the world could either have 
created or destroyed once it existed. That is, the protests following the Kent State 
massacre represented a fundamentally different type of opposition from the paradigm of 
the signature-supported petition like the New York Times advertisement. They were non-
deliberative, and because of that, required no framework, language, or clarifying reasons.   
 Because Noam Chomsky’s political work often contains strong criticisms of foreign 
policy far outside the scope of normal objections to government practices (he is a self-
described anarchist), he is, more so than perhaps any other figure in United States history, 
a public intellectual, one whose political accomplishments have been aimed at widening 
the scope of a private, academic dispute over politics into the public sphere for anyone 
with common sense and logic to critique. Public reaction to Noam Chomsky’s political 
work has been correspondingly ambivalent. Some have claimed him to be a desperate 
manipulator of political evidence. As Kate Windschuttle from the New Criterion wrote, 
Chomsky was well aware of the degree of violence that communist 
regimes had routinely directed at the people of their own countries. At the 
1967 New York forum he acknowledged both 'the mass slaughter of 
landlords in China' and 'the slaughter of landlords in North Vietnam' that 
had taken place once the communists came to power. His main objective, 
however, was to provide a rationalization for this violence, especially that 
of the National Liberation Front then trying to take control of South 
Vietnam.22 
 
                                                 
 21 As referenced in Alan Canfora, Historical Impact of Kent State and the 
National Student Strike—May, 1970 (accessed 16 February 2011); available from 
http://alancanfora.com/?q=node/8; Internet. 
 22 Kate Windschuttle, “The Hypocrisy of Noam Chomsky,” The New Criterion, 
21:9 (May 2003). 
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Windschuttle claimed that the National Liberation Front could never be considered a 
legitimate representative of the South Vietnam people, considering its penchant for 
violence. On the other hand, Chomsky is often seen as an intellectual hero, voted the 
greatest living intellectual figure by the magazine Prospect, and ranking seventh in the 
New Statesman’s “Heroes of Our Time” poll. Anthony Flint of The Boston Globe framed 
the debate as follows: 
Ask this intellectual radical why he is shunned by the mainstream, and 
he'll say that established powers have never been able to handle his brand 
of dissent… It was not surprising that Chomsky's radical critique met with 
indignant resistance. For every convert, it seemed, there was at least one 
nonbeliever who saw him as a lunatic leftist, a brewer of conspiracy 
theories, an annoyance, a one-note tune. He went from huddling with 
newspaper editors and bouncing ideas off them to being virtually 
banned… [F]or the most part, mainstream outlets shunned him. In the 
intellectual circles of Cambridge and beyond, many of the left-leaning 
thinkers who would seem to be his natural allies also turned away. A chief 
complaint seemed to be his tireless promotion of an omni-applicable 
analysis.23 
 
The key observation by Flint is that Chomsky wins “converts” and “nonbelievers” in 
equal measure; while the reason for this is still up for debate, within the context of 
opposition to the Vietnam War it supports the point that Chomsky was, ultimately, not 
inflaming the passions of the masses of students, causing them to rise up against the 
injustices of the system. He simply was not that persuasive, and it is not clear that any 
intellectual, public or otherwise, has the ability to manipulate public action purely 
through rational argumentation.24 Indeed, Chomsky’s role in the opposition movement 
                                                 
 23 Anthony Flint, “Divided Legacy,” The Boston Globe (November 19, 1995, 
accessed 17 February 2011), available at 
http://www.chomsky.info/onchomsky/19951119.htm.  
 
 24 There are, of course, obvious examples of speakers who were able to combine 
rational argumentation with fiery eloquence to create something extraordinary that far 
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seems, ironically, to have played a counterweight to the role of pseudoscientific racism 
and imperialism  in the support of the war: that is, it provided an ideological justification 
rather than acting as an ideological catalyst. Sometimes, that justification proved useful 
in framing the debate, as Chomsky’s “The Responsibility of Intellectuals” and American 
Power and the New Mandarins helped shape the intuitions of intellectual movements like 
the Vietnam Day Committee, the mass of signatures in the New York Times 
advertisement, into reasoned argumentation. This parallels exactly the way that social 
scientists shaped and rationalized support of the Vietnam War through claims of freedom 
and anti-communism in the other side of debate.  In other situations, that sort of 
justification proved to be unnecessary on both sides, as the Kent State-inspired protests 
were argumentless and emotional, needing no intellectual framework, just as were 
reactions to the attacks on the USS Maddox and Turner Joy by the government of the 
United States. Perhaps Chomsky could have been more effective, more “mainstream,” if 
he changed his approach to intellectualism, tried to passionately rally his radical side of 
the debate instead of relying on mountains of facts and rational argumentation to make 
his point. In the end though, Noam Chomsky seems to be happy occupying the space that 
he does, acting as a balance against many of the extreme right-wing claims of politics, 
neither winning nor losing the debate but simply allowing the debate to continue as it 
must.  
                                                 
transcended the limits of pure intellectualism (contemporary Martin Luther King, Jr. 
comes to mind). But, in the end, that does not seem to have been Chomsky’s goal.  
